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In the model, an expert of unknown ability sends a report about asset values to traders,
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ability is private to traders and only revealed through trades. When the expert’s reputa-
tion is sufficiently high, traders ignore their private signal about ability and the market
enters a reputational cascade in which no information about the expert reaches the mar-
ket. Reputational cascades are conducive to asset price bubbles, which eventually result
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1 Introduction
Models of asset pricing traditionally assume that traders’ information about assets is ex-
ogenous, yet financial news is often provided by experts of unknown ability who may act
strategically. Large investment banks, for instance, provide advice to clients in the form of
reports about firms, stocks, and other economic variables. Market participants must therefore
simultaneously incorporate expert advice and evaluate its reliability. This creates an endo-
geneity problem: the stronger the influence of the expert on the market, the harder it becomes
to back out information about his ability.
The 2008 financial crisis put a spotlight on the role played by financial experts in deter-
mining asset prices. Some of the most respected financial institutions were at the forefront of
backing assets that later turned out to be almost worthless. Regulators subsequently found
conflicts of interest and occasionally outright incompetence to be at fault for this failure. This
begs the following questions. If as it seems the experts were so wrong, how could they maintain
their reputation for so long? And why did traders not use their private information to trade
against bad expert recommendations? In retrospect, it seems that the status achieved by some
pundits prior to the crisis effectively turned their predictions into self-fulfilling prophecies, and
disabled the market’s ability to evaluate their true ability.
This paper builds a model of an asset market with financial advice, and analyzes the role
played by experts in market fluctuations. In particular, we study a sequential trading model
in the spirit of Glosten and Milgrom (1985), but replace the exogenous information of traders
by the report of an expert who may or may not be informed about the asset value. Traders
observe a private signal about expert ability. We then show that when the expert’s reputation
is sufficiently high, traders ignore their private signal and trade based only on reports. Price
movements thus become uninformative about expert ability. We refer to this kind of market
behavior as a reputational cascade. Although in a reputational cascade the market no longer
updates beliefs about ability, it still incorporates the expert’s advice into prices. Thus, if he
is of low ability, the market will go on absorbing the bad information provided by him.
The details of the model are as follows. Each period, one unit of a risky asset of unknown
fundamental value is traded. Information about the asset value is provided by a single long-
lived expert of unknown ability, in the form of cheap talk reports communicated to traders. An
expert of high ability sometimes observes a noisy signal about the asset value, and truthfully
reports the information he possesses. An expert of low ability, on the other hand, knows
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nothing about the asset value and acts strategically to maximize reputation. To this end,
he publishes reports, even though he has no information. At the beginning of each period,
a market maker sets prices competitively and a single trader arrives. There are two types
of traders. Liquidity traders trade for exogenous reasons.1 Informed traders are risk-neutral
profit maximizers. They privately observe the expert’s report and, when reading the report,
obtain a noisy signal of the expert’s ability. After one period, the report becomes public
information,2 but a trader’s information regarding expert ability remains private information
and thus can only be revealed through his action.
Our model’s flow of information is two-dimensional: information about the asset on the
one hand, and information about the expert on the other. When there is a clash between
the information in these two dimensions, traders are faced with a dilemma. A trader may for
instance observe a positive report about the asset value from the expert, but at the same time
receive a negative signal concerning expert ability. In this example, the report suggests that
the asset may currently be undervalued, while the trader’s signal suggests that it is in fact
overvalued. When such dilemmas occur the trader’s decision of whether to buy, sell or abstain
depends in general on the entire history. However, we show that if (i) expert reputation is
high and (ii) reports are sufficiently informative at the margin3 then, in equilibrium, traders
ignore the private signals they observe and blindly follow the reports they receive. In this case,
traders’ actions no longer reveal information about expert ability, and the market enters a
reputational cascade. Thus, while price adjustments prevent complete informational cascades
from occurring (Avery and Zemsky, 1998) our results establish that partial informational
cascades – whereby one entire dimension of the information flow altogether stops reaching the
market – do occur.
Reputational cascades are instrumental to understanding the role played by experts in
asset price bubbles. As long as the market is informative about the expert’s ability, then
price deviations from long-run levels are impeded on two fronts. (i) A low-ability expert’s
1Liquidity (noise) traders assure the existence of a market price, by absorbing the losses made by the market
maker on informed traders. They need not be irrational, but trade for reasons that are not informational.
2The assumption that the report becomes public information after one period can be relaxed, but is in
line with actual practices. Goldman Sachs, for instance, offers exclusive advice to its client investors, but
their recommendations eventually filter through to the public, either directly through public newsletters or
indirectly through blogs. E.g. http://www.businessinsider.com/goldman-buy-large-banks-2012-12.
The key assumption of our model lies in the fact that traders become informed of the report before the MM.
Appendix B explores the microfoundations of this assumption.
3Marginal informativeness refers to the ability of a single report to move the asset valuation, holding expert
reputation constant.
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reputation will on average decrease, limiting his impact on prices. (ii) A low-ability expert
exposes himself by publishing reports, and will therefore avoid releasing (false) information.
In a cascade, these two arguments no longer hold, and a low-ability expert inevitably exerts
greater influence on prices. First, his predictions become self-fulfilling prophecies. Second,
since he no longer fears revealing his type by publishing reports, the rate at which he releases
information increases.
When the market is in a cascade, it stops accumulating information about the expert,
but goes on accumulating information about the asset. Thus, while the expert’s reputation is
constant, the marginal informativeness of his reports is not. If asset fundamentals are not too
volatile, the marginal informativeness of an extra report will vanish and, in particular, will
eventually fall below the threshold needed to sustain the cascade. A crash occurs when the
market exits a reputational cascade driven by a low-ability expert. At this point, the market
starts losing faith in the ability of the expert, and prices dive. This mechanism contrasts
with usual arguments. Rather than being caused by the release of new information, the crash
results from the depreciation of past accumulated information.4
Finally, we compare market behavior in a cascade economy with that of a fictional economy
in which cascades never occur. We find that the cascade economy is less liquid, in that it has
a higher bid-ask spread, than the no-cascade economy. The reason is that the activity of
informed traders increases in a cascade, causing losses to the market maker.5 The market
maker’s equilibrium response is to increase the bid-ask spread to cover the losses with gains
from dealing with liquidity traders. Increased informed trader activity also leads to higher
trade frequency. These two results in conjunction imply that the cascade economy has higher
price volatility than the no-cascade economy.
After the literature review, the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes a model of a
financial market with advice. Section 3 analyzes the incentives of traders and experts, as well
as the price setting in this market. Section 4 contains the main results on the existence of
cascades. Section 5 applies the previous findings to analyze asset price bubbles and crashes.
Section 6 presents comparative statics illustrating the effect of cascades on liquidity and price
volatility. Section 7 concludes. Appendix A contains auxiliary results on trader behavior.
Appendix B demonstrates that our results depend on information asymmetry between traders
4See section 5.2 for an overview of the related literature on asset price bubbles.
5Since the informed traders have better information than the market maker, he must on average lose when
he trades with them, due to adverse selection.
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and market makers, and builds micro-foundations that explain the asymmetry. All proofs are
contained in Appendix C.
1.1 Related Literature
The present paper is to the best of our knowledge the first to examine asset markets’ failure
to efficiently evaluate the ability of financial experts.
Our paper is first and foremost related to the by now classic literature on asset price
formation (Grossman, 1976; Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle,
1985), and in particular to the subsequent analysis of herding and informational cascades
in asset markets (Avery and Zemsky, 1998; Dasgupta and Prat, 2008; Park and Sabourian,
2011). As in Avery and Zemsky, multidimensional uncertainty plays an important role in
our paper. However, all the aforementioned papers assume exogenously informed traders,
whereas we examine the role of financial experts. Thus, unlike them, our model incorporates
uncertainty about the precision of information which stems from uncertainty about expert
ability. Moreover, while our reputational cascades constitute a form of informational cascades,
informed traders do not “herd” in a reputational cascade. They buy following a positive report,
and sell following a negative one. If their behavior is akin to herding, it is in the sense that
they blindly follow the expert’s advice once they observe that enough traders have done so
before them.
The role of financial experts in the procurement of information was first examined by Ad-
mati and Pfleiderer (1986) and later by Benabou and Laroque (1992). Admati and Pfleiderer
examine optimal disclosure of information for a profit maximizing financial expert and shows
that, typically, this entails adding noise to the information that the expert actually has in
order to overcome the dilution in the value of information due to its leakage through infor-
mative prices. But, in line with earlier papers, there is no uncertainty in equilibrium about
the quality of the information provided by the expert. In this sense, our paper is possibly
closer to Benabou and Laroque. The authors analyze the credibility of a financial expert with
short-run incentives to deceive the market and resort to insider trading.6 While Benabou and
Laroque study a financial expert who cares about reputation, their expert – unlike ours – is
of known ability (but unknown honesty). Furthermore, prices play no role in evaluating the
expert. Ottaviani and Sørensen (2006c) is in parts related to us. In their paper profesional
6In a similar vein, Allen and Gale (1992) investigate how an uninformed manipulator can make a profit on
the stock market by pretending to be an informed trader.
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forecasters endeavor, through their forecasts of a stock price, to convince the market that
they are well informed. If the forecasts affect the price, a “beauty contest” among forecasters
emerges. However, whereas Ottaviani and Sørensen investigate a one-shot game in which the
market always learns about forecasters’ ability, our focus is on dynamic revelation of infor-
mation about expert ability, and the ultimate failure of the market to properly channel this
information.7
In Section 5.2 we discuss how our work relates to the literature on asset price bubbles.
2 A Model of a Financial Market with Advice
We consider a discrete-time sequential trade market for financial assets in the spirit of Glosten
and Milgrom (1985), and introduce a strategic expert who is the sole source of information
about the asset value.
The Asset. We examine an asset whose fundamental value is unknown and follows the
stochastic process {θt}∞t=1, where θt ∈ {−1, 1} and E(θt) = 0 for all t. We impose no further
restriction on the stochastic process, except that it is common knowledge among all market
participants.8
The Market Maker. Prices are set by a market maker (MM) who interacts with an
infinite sequence of individuals chosen from a continuum of traders. Each trader has the
option to buy or sell one unit of the asset, or to abstain from trading. The sequence of traders
is indexed by t, and yt ∈ {a, b, n} denotes the action of the trader in that period: yt = a if
he buys, yt = b if he sells, and yt = n if he abstains. The MM posts ask (p
a
t ) and bid (p
b
t)
prices at which he will sell or buy one unit of the asset, respectively. The MM is risk-neutral
and competitive, and quoted prices thus equal the expected asset value conditional on (a)
all publicly available information at the beginning of period t (i.e. before trade takes place),
denoted Ht, and (b) the current order of trade. Let Et(·) = E(·|Ht). Hence pat = Et(θt|yt = a)
7More generally, we are connected to the broader reputational cheap talk literature (Scharfstein and Stein,
1990; Trueman, 1994; Zwiebel, 1998; Ottaviani and Sørensen, 2006a,b), which does not analyze asset markets.
They find that experts tend to bias reports toward priors and that multiple experts tend to herd.
8One possibility is to think of the asset as a “growth stock” that currently pays no dividends, but which is
expected in the future to yield a stochastic payoff V . θt is then the expectation of V , conditional on all period
t information. Players try to learn θt, since this is the best estimate of the value of the stock.
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and pbt = Et(θt|yt = b). We let p0t = Et(θt) denote the public valuation of the asset at the
beginning of period t, which we sometimes refer to as the “price” for simplicity.
The Expert. There is a single financial expert (FE) who remains the same throughout
the game, and has ability type τ ∈ {B,G} which is drawn at the beginning of the game, and
is known only to him. With probability 1−λ0 he is bad (τ = B) and knows nothing about the
asset. On the other hand, with probability λ0 the FE is good (τ = G), and possesses valuable
information: at the beginning of period t he observes, with probability 1/2, the private signal
xt ∈ {−1, 1} such that
P(xt = θt) = φ ∈ (1/2, 1).
We let xt = 0 if no signal is observed in period t. Each period, and before trade takes place,
the FE chooses whether or not to publish a cheap talk report rt ∈ {−1, 1}. We let rt = 0 if
the FE does not publish a report in period t.
Before trade, the expert’s report is observed by traders alone. This informational advan-
tage conferred upon traders is crucial to the analysis of our paper.9 To simplify the analysis,
we further assume that the expert’s report eventually filters through and become public knowl-
edge after one period.10 LetRt = (r0, ..., rt) denote the sequence of reports and Yt = (y0, ..., yt)
the sequence of trades up to and including period t. The public information at the beginning
of a period thus consists of previous reports as well as the trading history:
Ht = {Rt−1,Yt−1}.
Traders. There are two broad classes of traders. Informed traders gather information
from the FE and maximize expected profit at the market maker’s expense, while liquidity
traders act for exogenous motives and without regard for expected profit. Let µ > 0 be
the probability of an informed trader arriving in any given period, and assume that liquidity
traders buy or sell the asset with equal probability.11
While traders do not hold any direct private information concerning the asset, reading
9Appendix B first examines the implication of dropping this assumption, and later explores its micro-
foundations. In particular, we show that it can be supported for some intermediate cost of acquiring informa-
tion early.
10See also further discussion of this simplifying assumption in the introduction.
11The latter assumption is for expositional convenience. We only need µ > 0 together with the liquidity
traders’ willingness to trade at any price to assure the existence of a market price, despite the information
asymmetry.
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reports (imperfectly) informs them of the expert’s type via the private signal st ∈ {0, 1}. For
instance, the expert may in his reports reveal some information regarding his assessment of
other auxiliary economic variables which traders know something about, and which they can
then use to make inferences about the expert’s type. No report implies no signal, so that
st = 0 if rt = 0.
12 When a bad expert publishes a report, he always generates the signal
st = 0, i.e. P(st = 1|τ = B) = 0. On the other hand
P(st = 1|τ = G, rt 6= 0) = pi,
where pi ∈ (0, 1). Observing st = 1 is thus hard evidence that τ = G. Let Pt(·) = P(·|Ht).
The trader’s belief about the expert’s type, based on his private information, is then βt =
Pt(τ = G|rt, st).
Finally, let ξ
t
denote an informed trader’s strategy in period t. This is a vector with
elements ξytt (rt, st) that specify the probability with which he takes action yt conditional on
information set (rt, st) and
∑
yt
ξytt (rt, st) = 1.
Reputation. Each period, the market updates beliefs regarding the expert’s ability τ
using all publicly available information. We let λt = Pt(τ = G) denote the reputation of the
FE at the beginning of period t. The good expert is a behavior type, and in particular we
assume that he is truthful and always reports his own signal: rt = xt for all t. The bad expert,
on the other hand, is risk neutral and cares to maximize his reputation. We assume, in the
interest of tractability, that he is myopic in the sense that each period he chooses his strategy
so as to maximize next period’s (expected) reputation.
Let q+t (resp. q
−
t ) denote the probability, conditional on Ht, that a good expert receives
a positive signal (resp. negative signal) in period t.13 Similarly, let σt = (σ
+
t , σ
−
t ) denote the
reporting strategy of a bad expert in period t, where σ+t (resp. σ
−
t ) indicates the probability
of a positive report (resp. negative report).
The Game. Within a given period, the FE first publishes his report which is read only
by the trader, the MM then announces a bid and an ask price, and finally the trader makes his
order to the MM. A good expert is always truthful, rt = xt, whereas a bad expert is strategic.
An equilibrium is a vector of prices, strategies and beliefs (p
t
, ξ
t
, σt, λt, βt), such that the agents
12I.e. no report implies no signal beyond the fact that no report was sent, which itself may be informative.
13Thus, q+t = Pt(xt = 1|τ = G) and q−t = Pt(xt = −1|τ = G).
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maximize payoffs and beliefs are derived using Bayes’ Rule, whenever possible.14
3 Preliminary Analysis
We explore in this section the detailed workings of the market. Our aim is to shed some light on
agents’ behavior and the formation of prices. The expert moves first and decides which report
to send with what probability. In doing so, he affects informed traders’ valuations. Traders’
actions and bid/ask prices are then jointly determined. Prices thus reflect the information of
all active traders: informed traders on the one hand and liquidity traders on the other. Section
3.1 is devoted to the study of the expert. We analyze his incentives to distort information if
he is bad, and explore in particular how the behavior of a bad expert generally differs from
that of a good one. We then examine in section 3.2 the behavior of traders and the formation
of prices.
3.1 Reporting Strategies
A low-ability expert faces the following trade-off. If he releases a report, he faces the risk that
the action of an informed trader may reveal information about his true type. On the flip side,
the action of a liquidity trader may corroborate his report and thereby boost his reputation.
If he chooses instead not to release a report, he avoids the risk of revealing more information
about his type – over and above the fact that he chose not to release a report. But if a bad
expert is more likely than a good one not to release a report, he will lose reputation for sure.
In equilibrium, his strategy will balance these two motives.
Reputation is updated using all publicly available information – consisting of the history
of reports and trades. We can express next period’s reputation as a function of (rt, yt) as
follows
λt+1(rt, yt) =
λtq
rt
t Pt(yt|rt, G)
λtq
rt
t Pt(yt|rt, G) + (1− λt)σrtt Pt(yt|rt, B)
. (1)
Notice here that yt only imperfectly reveals st. This is due to the presence of liquidity traders,
but is further aggravated whenever informed traders do not reveal their private information
through trades.
14Payoff maximization implies that at all t, (i) the prices p
t
yield zero expected profits to the MM, conditional
on (ξ
t
, σt, λt); (ii) the bad expert’s strategy σt maximizes Et(λt+1|ξt, σt); and (iii) the trader’s strategy ξt
maximizes expected profits conditional on (p
t
, σt, βt).
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By publishing report rt, the expert induces a distribution δt(rt, τ) over trading outcomes.
15
Let λet+1(rt) = Eδt(rt,B)(λt+1(rt, yt)). This denotes the reputation which a bad expert expects
to have next period if he publishes rt now. It is straightforward to see that any equilibrium
must induce a mixed strategy on the part of a bad FE. In particular, the following equilibrium
condition must hold:
λet+1(1) = λ
e
t+1(0) = λ
e
t+1(−1). (2)
The realized market price (which reflects the trading outcome) is the only channel through
which reputation is updated, and therefore the expert chooses his report so as to generate
the distribution of prices that is most favorable to his reputation. The obvious difficulty to
efficiently evaluate experts in such an environment provides important leverage to experts of
low ability. The following lemma examines the resulting behavior on the part of low ability
experts. We let σt(ξt) denote the strategy solving (2), i.e. a bad expert’s best response to
traders playing ξ
t
. Moreover, we define an expert’s aggressiveness in period t as the probability
with which he publishes a report in that period. For a good expert, this is qt = q
+
t + q
−
t . For
a bad expert, it is σt = σ
+
t + σ
−
t .
Lemma 1. σt(ξt) is uniquely determined. Moreover:
1. If ξyt
t
(rt, 1) = ξ
yt
t
(rt, 0) for all (yt, rt), then σt(ξt) = qt.
2. If ξyt
t
(rt, 1) 6= ξytt (rt, 0) for some (yt, rt), then σt(ξt) < qt.
Part 1 says that when the distribution over actions is the same regardless of the expert’s
type, then the best thing a bad expert can do is to replicate the frequencies with which a
good expert publishes different reports. Part 2 states that when the distribution over actions
is affected by expert type, then a bad expert is strictly less aggressive than a good one. As
discussed above, publishing a report is risky, in that it releases information about the expert’s
type to the traders.
3.2 Price Formation
This section takes the expert’s strategy as given, and analyzes price setting and traders’
behavior during period t. The information structure of our model decomposes asset prices
into two components: the information accumulated in the reporting history and the reputation
15This distribution reflects both the presence of liquidity traders and informed traders: δytt (rt, τ) =
Pt(yt|τ, rt).
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of the expert. The first component is identified by the valuation conditional on the expert
being good, or simply the conditional valuation, which is given by
θGt (Rt−1) = E(θt|Rt−1, τ = G). (3)
Given that the reporting history is of no value if the expert is bad, valuations weigh the
reporting history according to the best estimate of its reliability. We can thus compute the
public valuation as
p0t = λtθ
G
t (Rt−1). (4)
Valuations are simply the product of reputation and the conditional valuation.
Consider next an informed trader. He observes (rt, st), which allows him to update his
belief about expert type to
βt(rt, st) =
λtq
rt
t P(st|rt, G)
λtq
rt
t P(st|rt, G) + (1− λt)σrtt P(st|rt, B)
. (5)
Since st = 1 perfectly reveals that the FE is good, we obtain βt(rt, 1) = 1. The private
signal st = 0 on the other hand induces the updated beliefs βt(rt, 0) =
λtq
rt
t (1−pi)
λtq
rt
t (1−pi)+(1−λt)σrtt
. In
general, this can be greater or smaller than the public belief λt, since the report itself reveals
information about the expert’s type. But clearly, if σrtt ≥ qrtt then βt(rt, 0) < λt, since in this
case both the report and the signal are more likely to be observed if the expert is bad.
An informed trader’s valuation of the asset, denoted vt(rt, st), departs from (4) on two
dimensions. First, his belief about the expert is updated according to βt(rt, st). Second, the
trader possesses the expert’s latest report, rt. We thus have
vt(rt, st) = βt(rt, st)θ
G
t (Rt−1, rt). (6)
Consider now the MM. He sets a price that reflects the information revealed by the trader’s
action, taking into account the possibility of uninformative liquidity trading. Let Z denote
the event that the trader is informed. For yt ∈ {a, b} we then obtain
pytt = Pt(Z|yt)
∑
rt,st
Pt(rt, st|yt, Z)vt(rt, st) + (1− Pt(Z|yt))λtθGt (Rt−1). (7)
With probability Pt(Z|yt), the trader is informed and the market maker’s valuation is the
average of the valuation of informed traders taking action yt. With probability 1 − Pt(Z|yt)
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the MM faces a liquidity trader, in which case trade reveals no new information about the
asset.16
An informed trader buys if vt(rt, st) ≥ pat , sells if vt(rt, st) ≤ pbt and abstains otherwise.
His action thus depends on his own valuation and the price chart, which reflects the public
valuation and the information revealed by the trader’s action. Notice that the asymmetry of
information between informed traders and MM is three-fold. An informed trader knows the
content of the latest report, his private signal of the expert’s type, and the motives of his
action.17 We show in Appendix A that, in general, it is impossible to order traders’ valuations
according to their information set (rt, st). This ordering is history dependent. However, for
any history, prices are well-defined. Moreover, the ask price (respectively, bid price) is strictly
larger (respectively, smaller) than the public valuation.18
Lemma 2. Prices are uniquely determined given σt. Moreover, in equilibrium and when
λt > 0 then p
b
t < p
0
t < p
a
t .
4 Reputational Cascades
Our model departs from previous literature by the nature of its information flow to the various
market participants and, ultimately, by the way in which prices eventually incorporate this
information. Each period, information flows in the form of signal xt to the FE and signal
st to trader t. Our flow of information thus takes the following simple form: information
about the asset value on the one hand (viz. xt), and information about the reliability of this
information on the other hand (viz. st). Given that good experts accurately report the signals
they observe, some information contained in signal xt always reaches the market (Proposition
1), by construction. Price adjustments prevent complete informational cascades from ever
occurring (Avery and Zemsky, 1998). Notwithstanding, we show that partial informational
cascades – whereby one entire dimension of the informational flow (viz. st) altogether stops
reaching the market – do occur in our model (Theorem 1). Our informational cascades are of
the reputational kind: cascades prevent the efficient flow of information regarding expert type
and, thereby, reputation to evolve normally. First, reflecting unresolved uncertainty about
16Note however that if the MM faces a liquidity trader his valuation of the asset differs from last period’s
price since in the meantime last period’s report has become public information and public beliefs about expert
type have been updated.
17I.e. he knows that he is an informed trader and not a liquidity trader.
18As is standard in this type of models, the willingness of liquidity traders to absorb loses implies that the
market does not break down, despite the obvious adverse selection problem.
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reliability of past information, cascades thus prevent prices from converging to the true asset
value. Second, and perhaps more worryingly, cascades induce self-fulfilling prophecies whereby
– among others – a bad expert’s forecasts always hit target.
The concept of an informational cascade is straightforward. When the market is in an
informational cascade, no new information about the asset reaches the market. Prices therefore
stop evolving. The following definition is adapted from Avery and Zemsky (1998).
Definition 1. A complete informational cascade, occurs in period t when
Pt(yt, rt|θt) = Pt(yt, rt) , ∀ rt, yt. (8)
We begin this section with a simple result. Namely, given that the focus of our analysis is
on truthful equilibria – whereby good experts accurately report the (informative) signals they
observe – informational cascades never occur in the framework we explore.
Proposition 1. An informational cascade never occurs if λt > 0.
The rest of this section aims to mitigate the view expressed in our first proposition, and
show that while some information always reaches the market, other information is typically
lost under way. The following definition extends the concept introduced in definition 1, and
forms the basis of all subsequent results.
Definition 2. A reputational cascade occurs in period t when
Pt(yt, rt|τ) = Pt(yt, rt) , ∀ rt, yt. (9)
In contrast to an informational cascade, the only information which in a reputational cas-
cade does not reach the market is information about the expert.19 As the following lemma in-
dicates, reputational cascades do however have important consequences. First, and evidently,
they impede the normal evolution of expert reputation. Second, they induce self-fulfilling
prophecies whereby – among others – bad expert forecasts always hit target.
Lemma 3. If the market is in a reputational cascade in period t then
1. P(λt+1 = λt) = 1.
19Of course, any complete informational cascade is in particular a reputational cascade.
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2. An informed trader who observes rt = 1 buys the asset with probability 1.
3. An informed trader who observes rt = −1 sells the asset with probability 1.
While informational cascades never occur, we next show that reputational cascades are
in principle possible. The intuition follows from two steps. First, as λt approaches 1 the
valuation of traders, vt(rt, st), converges to the conditional valuation, θ
G
t (Rt−1, rt). Second,
we can strictly order the conditional valuations and the prices: θGt (Rt−1, 1) > pat > pbt >
θGt (Rt−1,−1) for all λt. Thus, as reputation increases toward one, traders begin to trade
exclusively according to the report rt and, in particular, ignore any available information
regarding expert type. As discussed earlier, we can view this as a conflict between two pieces
of information. The trader has private information about the asset and about the expert. If
at some point it is sufficiently likely that the expert is of high ability, then the information
about the asset is always more valuable to the trader. Thus, even if a trader receives a bad
signal about the expert’s ability, he cannot afford to ignore the information contained in the
expert’s report.
The next proposition summarizes our findings: above a threshold reputation, informed
traders start ignoring st and the market enters a reputational cascade.
Proposition 2. There exists λˆt ∈ (0, 1) such that if λt ≥ λˆt then the the market is in a
reputational cascade.
The result of Proposition 2 is founded upon the observation that higher reputation en-
hances the asymmetry of information between traders and MM and, therefore, raises the oc-
currence of profitable opportunities for trade. We next develop the following complementary
insight: other things equal, higher marginal informativeness of reports enhances information
asymmetry between traders and MM. Thus more informative reports enhance the gains from
trade and tend to facilitate the occurrence of reputational cascades.
Define, whenever θGt (Rt−1,−1) ≥ 0, the quantities20
I+t = 1−
θGt (Rt−1)
θGt (Rt−1, 1)
, I−t = 1−
θGt (Rt−1,−1)
θGt (Rt−1)
.
20By extension, whenever θGt (Rt−1, 1) ≤ 0 define I+t = 1 − θ
G
t (Rt−1,1)
θGt (Rt−1) and I
−
t = 1 − θ
G
t (Rt−1)
θGt (Rt−1,−1) . When
θGt (Rt−1,−1) < 0 ≤ θGt (Rt−1), then a natural measure is I−t = 1 + |θGt (Rt−1,−1)| · θGt (Rt−1) > 1, whereas
I+t is as in the text. The last case can be defined similarly.
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By construction, both quantities lie in [0, 1]. I+t (respectively, I
−
t ) measures the marginal
informativeness of a positive report (respectively, negative report) given the sequence of pre-
vious reports Rt−1. The greater I+t the more information a positive report in period t brings
to the table. The quantity It = min{I+t , I−t } measures the minimum marginal informativeness
of reports in period t, and I = inft,Rt−1{I+t , I−t } the minimum marginal informativeness of
reports, given any possible history.
Proposition 3. Higher marginal informativeness of reports facilitates cascades:
λˆt
dIt
≤ 0 and lim
It→0
λˆt = 1.
We can now state the paper’s main result. The market either starts in a cascade or it does
not. If it does not, bad experts will nevertheless on occasions publish reports. Doing otherwise
would arise suspicion. With positive probability, exogenous shock to prices (liquidity traders)
corroborate reports and, thereby, help improve the reputation of the expert. For sufficiently
high reputation, the market enters a cascade. At this point the market stops gathering
information concerning the expert, but goes on accumulating information about the assets. If
the marginal informativeness of reports is bounded away from zero, then the market remains in
a cascade permanently. Otherwise the marginal informativeness of reports eventually vanishes,
as does with it the relative advantage of observing reports early. Gains from trade diminish,
and the market exits the cascade it was in. The process described here then repeats itself.
Theorem 1. There exists µˆ < 1 such that if µ ≥ µˆ then a reputational cascade occurs with
positive probability, independently of expert type (Good or Bad). However, if I = 0, then a
cascade ends in finite time almost surely.
When the mass of informed traders is large, trades naturally tend to be attributed to them.
To the extent that informed traders respond to the signal st, trading patterns thus tend to
induce large shifts in reputation. The object of the first part of the theorem is to show that,
under such circumstances, the occasional occurrence of liquidity traders can alone drive the
expert’s reputation above the threshold of Proposition 2 – and hence trigger a reputational
cascade.21 Notice that liquidity traders thus play a dual role in our model. First, they prevent
21When there are few informed traders, actions will more often be attributed to liquidity trading, and
even if the expert is lucky, his reputation will only move toward the threshold in small increments. As we
approach the threshold, bad experts start behaving more like good ones, and traders become less responsive
to st. Reputational adjustments thus decrease progressively. We have been unable to show whether or not
this slowdown is sufficient to maintain the market below the threshold of Proposition 2.
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the breakdown of the market. Second, they are instrumental in the build-up of reputational
cascades.
The second part of the theorem follows from Proposition 3. If I = 0 then, as reports
accumulate and marginal informativeness falls, the threshold reputation needed to sustain a
cascade increases. Since reputation in a cascade is fixed, the market must first exit the cascade
it is in before it (possibly) re-enters a cascade again.
The minimum informativeness of reports (I) is intuitively linked to the volatility of the
fundamental asset value. High volatility evidently sustains informativeness, since past infor-
mation in this case rapidly loses relevance. By contrast, when the fundamental value is fixed,
a good expert (and indeed a bad expert mimicking his behavior) eventually produces over-
whelming evidence of one of the two states. The marginal informativeness of reports therefore
disappears in the limit. It is for instance easy to show that if fundamentals are independent
across time periods then I = 1. By contrast, if the fundamental value is fixed, so that θt+1 = θt
for all t, then I = 0. By Theorem 1, volatility therefore induces durable cascades. We show
in the next section that the absence of volatility is on the other hand conducive to market
crashes.
5 Application: Bubbles and Crashes
The short-lived bubble of the NASDAQ during the late 1990s provides the stereotypical exam-
ple of the kind of episodes which our paper aims to contribute to explain. As shown in Figure
1 prices first rose steadily over the period 1994-1999, at a rate comparable to the average of
the whole series. A period of frenzy began in January of 1999, in which the rate of growth
suddenly accelerated. Quoting one observer,“Buzzwords like networking, new paradigm, in-
formation technologies, internet, consumer-driven navigation, tailored web experience, and
many more examples of empty double-speak filled the media. [...] Investors started blindly
grabbing every new issue without even looking at a business plan to find out, for example,
how long the company would take before making a profit, if ever.”22 The market crashed on
March 11, 2000, eventually losing 78% of its value.
First, our model explains episodes of frenzies, in which prices start evolving rapidly in one
direction. We show that when the market enters a reputational cascade (i) trading frequency
suddenly augments and (ii) price paths start following past trends. Second, our model sheds
22Andrew Beattie on the DotCom crash. Source: http://www.investopedia.com/features/crashes/
crashes8.asp
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Figure 1: NASDAQ Closing Values, 1994 to 2008
light on crashes. The intuition is simple: when the market is in a reputational cascade, it
stops accumulating information about the expert but goes on accumulating information about
the asset; the stock of accumulated information then depreciates at once when eventually the
market exits the cascade.
The following proposition is central to the analysis of this section. It follows directly from
Lemmas 1 and 3, and is therefore stated without further proof.
Proposition 4. In equilibrium, when the market is in a reputational cascade, then σt = qt
and, in particular, the bad expert is as aggressive as the good expert: σt = qt. When the
market is outside a reputational cascade, the bad expert is less aggressive than the good expert:
σt < qt.
It is worth repeating the intuition here. Outside a cascade, publishing a report is risky for
a bad expert since doing so he releases information about his type to traders, while traders’
actions may reveal this information. This induces a bad expert to publish reports less often
than a good expert would. In a cascade, publishing a report is on the other hand risk-less to
a bad expert, who therefore replicates the behavior of a good expert. In particular, he starts
publishing reports more often.
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Section 5.1 contains our results. In section 5.2 we present a discussion and an overview of
related literature on bubbles and crashes.
5.1 Cascades, Bubbles and Crashes
This section is organized around four simple results. Results 1 and 2 relate to the early frenzy
phase. Results 3 and 4 explain the actual crash of the market. For clarity of exposition, we
assume that the asset value is fixed.23
The frenzy phase of the market is first explained by the observation that the frequency
of trade augments in a cascade. The intuition is as follows. According to Proposition 4,
bad experts publish more aggressively in a cascade. Furthermore, when the market is in a
cascade then, conditional on a report being published, an informed trader chooses to trade
with probability 1. These two observations lead to the following result:
Result 1. The frequency of trade augments in a cascade. If the market is in a cascade at
time t? and outside a cascade at time t† then Pt?(yt? = n) < Pt†(yt† = n).
Our second result records the following simple observations. If the market is in a cascade
then prices track reports, going up following a positive report and going down following a
negative one. But since bad experts strive to mimic good ones (Proposition 4), they tend to
publish positive reports when prices are high and negative reports when prices are low. So
in a cascade, prices follow past trends: moving upwards if prices are high and downwards if
prices are low.
Result 2. In a cascade, prices follow past trends. If the market is in a cascade at time t then
letting pt denote the price at which trade takes place in period t we have:
1. θGt (Rt−1) > 0⇒ Pt(pt > pt−1) > Pt(pt < pt−1);
2. θGt (Rt−1) < 0⇒ Pt(pt > pt−1) < Pt(pt < pt−1).
Results 1 and 2 together draw the contour of the frenzy phase of the market. The trading
frequency is higher, and prices are likely to follow previous trends.
We now explore the workings of the crash phase. As indicated in (4), the prices of our
model are made up of two terms. Reputation on the one hand, and conditional valuation
23I.e. θt+1 = θt with probability one.
17
on the other. The following break-down of the period-to-period change in public valuation is
instructive.
p0t+1 − p0t = [λt+1 − λt]θGt (Rt−1) + λt+1
[
θGt+1(Rt)− θGt (Rt−1)
]
.
The first term constitutes the price effect of a change in reputation. The second term embodies
the marginal effect of an extra report. Changes to reputation affect the valuation of the
entire reporting history, and therefore prices are more sensitive the greater the information
accumulated in the reporting history. We henceforth refer to |θGt (Rt−1)| as the price sensitivity
in period t. During a cascade, sensitivity builds up as reports accumulate. In particular, we
have the following result.
Result 3. The sensitivity of prices is higher when the market exits a cascade than when
it enters one. If the market enters a cascade a time t? and exits the cascade at time t† then
|θG
t†(Rt†−1)| > |θGt?(Rt?−1)|.
High price sensitivity makes the market vulnerable to sudden drops in reputation. Ac-
cording to Result 3, this is exactly the situation prevailing when the market exits a cascade.
Our final result provides the complementary insight explaining crashes: if the expert is
bad, then at the time a cascade ends his reputation will on average fall. Effectively, at that
point, the expert brings the market down with him.
Result 4. A bad expert’s reputation on average decreases outside a cascade. If the market
is outside a cascade at time t then Et(λt+1|τ = B) < λt.
Our results summarize as follows. Suppose the price is initially positive and that the expert
is bad. When the market enters a cascade, a frenzy begins which is caused by increased access
to information and higher willingness to act on this information. The price increases rapidly,
until at some point the market exits the cascade. At that point, the price is more sensitive to
changes in reputation. Since reputation on average goes down outside a cascade, a large fall
of the price ensues.
5.2 Discussion and Related Literature
The previous section’s results are founded upon (i) an informational friction – the imperfect
observability of experts’ type – and (ii) experts’ strategic behavior. We first review related
literature and then discuss our position relative to previous work.
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The literature on asset price bubbles and crashes can, roughly speaking, be divided into
three strands of research. A first group of papers emphasizes the role of frictions in finan-
cial markets. While the nature of the frictions varies (capital constraints, transaction costs,
regulatory constraints), all papers in this first group share the same flavor: some form of
friction induces a lack of arbitrage. A second group of papers exploits distorted incentives
among market participants. The idea is as follows: to the extent that market participants act
upon motives unrelated to the long-term profitability of trades, prices will in general deviate
from fundamentals. Finally, a third strand of research focuses on market manipulation. Here,
one group of market participants strives to distort prices in order to take advantage of other
market participants.24
Frictions: The early literature on speculation under rational expectations, such as for instance
Tirole (1982), focused on frictions such as restricted short-selling as a source of inefficiency.
However, most regulatory constraints concerning short-selling have disappeared during the
extensive wave of reforms of the 1980s. In Shleifer and Vishny (1997), professional fund man-
agers rely on client investors’ capital in order to operate arbitrage. But arbitrage opportuni-
ties are founded upon long-term perspectives, while fund managers must report intermediate
losses. Such intermediate losses are assumed to lead to less investment which is bad for fund
managers, who may for that reason refrain from exploiting all arbitrage opportunities. In
Lee (1998) transaction costs lead traders to accumulate information until a trigger occurs, at
which point the sudden release of traders’ information induces prices to re-adjust abruptly.
Barlevy and Veronesi (2003) demonstrate that capital constraints can induce discontinuous
price movements if some rational investors are informed about fundamentals while others are
not. As prices decline, uninformed investors surmise that informed traders received negative
information, which leads them to reduce their demand for assets. Capital constraints on the
part of informed traders prevent these from absorbing assets’ excess supply until prices drop
lower yet.
Distorted incentives: The bulk of papers on distorted incentives examines the conspicuous
agency problems found in financial markets. For instance, fund managers with limited liabil-
ity maximize expected fees rather than expected profits, and may therefore forego arbitrage
24Important papers which do not fall within these categories include, among others, Zeira (1999), and Abreu
and Brunnermeier (2003). In Zeira (1999) market crashes follow sudden and exogenous release of information.
Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) examine a setup in which traders become aware that assets are overvalued
but attempt to ride the bubble to the last minute in order to maximize profits.
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opportunities (Allen and Gorton, 1993; Cuoco and Kaniel, 2011; Kaniel and Kondor, 2013).
Similarly, fund managers with career concerns bias their choices towards a priori more likely
actions in order to appear competent, possibly ignoring relevant information concerning fun-
damentals (Dasgupta and Prat, 2006, 2008; Dasgupta et al., 2011; Guerrieri and Kondor,
2012). The papers by Gennotte and Leland (1990) and Jacklin et al. (1992) on the other
hand explore the destabilizing role played by deterministic trading strategies akin to portfolio
insurance.
Market manipulation: In DeLong et al. (1990) the presence of momentum traders allows
strategic traders to create and exploit short-term bubbles in the market. By contrast, in
Benabou and Laroque (1992) one agent – the guru – plays a dual role. On the one hand,
he informs other market participants. On the other hand, he trades the assets for which he
supplies information. This dual role allows him to sell short assets whose prices he strategically
boosts. In both papers, speculative behavior is purely destabilizing in the short run.
While our paper departs from all existing analyses, the views developed here provide
complementary insights to those previously held. Within the aforementioned taxonomy our
paper is, as indicated earlier, primarily related to the strand of research exploring frictions as
a source of inefficiency. But whereas bubbles proceed from insufficient arbitrage in the bulk
of papers considered, our bubbles are by contrast related to the occurrence of reputational
cascades. Our emphasis on the procurement of information by financial experts and the
agency problem which results, relates our paper to the second group of papers mentioned
above. The manipulative behavior of bad experts attempting to influence prices in order to
build a reputation relates our paper to the last strand of research discussed here.
6 Liquidity and Price Volatility
In this section we present and discuss some basic results on liquidity and price volatility. To
assess the impact of reputational cascades, we follow Park and Sabourian (2011) in defining a
hypothetical no-cascade economy, to contrast with the cascade economy we have analyzed until
now. The two are identical, except that whenever the cascade economy is in a reputational
cascade, then in the no-cascade economy: (i) only the trader with highest valuation buys, and
(ii) only the trader with the lowest valuation sells. As shown in Appendix B, this would be the
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case if the reports were received simultaneously by the MM and the trader.25 To distinguish
between the two cases we use a tilde to denote variables in the cascade economy, e.g. p˜at , and
a hat to denote variables in the no-cascade economy, e.g. pˆat .
We start by analyzing liquidity which, following the literature, we define as the inverse of
the bid-ask spread. In a cascade, traders choose to trade with probability 1. This worsens the
adverse selection for the MM, and drives up the bid-ask spread necessary to avoid losses. We
thus get the following result:
Result 5. Suppose the cascade and no-cascade economies are identical at the beginning of
period t. The bid-ask spread is larger in the cascade economy than in the no-cascade economy:
p˜at − p˜bt > pˆat − pˆbt .
Finally, we analyze price volatility. We define this by letting pt = p
a
t if the trader buys
the asset, pt = p
b
t if he sells it, and pt = p
n
t = Et(θ|yt = n) if he abstains.26 We then define
volatility as the variance of the price conditional on all available public information at the
beginning of period t: Vt(pt) = Et[(pt − p0t )2].27 Combining results 1 and 5 allows us to show
the following:
Result 6. Suppose the cascade and no-cascade economies are identical in at the beginning of
period t. Price volatility is higher in the cascade economy than in the no-cascade economy:
Vt(p˜t) > Vt(pˆt).
Result 6 is a simple consequence of trading occurring more often and with a larger price
spread in the cascade economy than in the no-cascade economy. As we have shown, this is
driven both by the desire of traders in a cascade to trade regardless of their private signal,
and the increased aggressiveness of the bad expert.
This section therefore shows that reputational cascades have the “undesirable” properties
that they make markets less liquid and prices more volatile.
25Notice, however, that the assumption we make here is not equivalent to the model explored in Appendix
B. Here we fix trader behavior, but we still assume that the MM receives the report after trading has occurred.
Changing this assumption would also affect price setting outside a cascade. Therefore, the hypothetical no-
cascade economy seems to be the most appropriate benchmark.
26The case of abstention can be seen as defining a price implicitly, in that information may be revealed by
the decision not to trade.
27Notice that this definition of price volatility is within a given period, rather than between two periods. In
general, we do not have p0t = pt−1, and therefore Et(pt) 6= pt−1.
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7 Conclusion
The present paper has explored the effectiveness of asset markets as a tool for evaluating
financial experts. We have demonstrated that expert reputation can cascade, in the sense
that no new information is revealed about the expert’s ability. This contrasts with the fact
that markets can never be uninformative about fundamentals. As a consequence, whenever
the market is in a cascade, a low-ability expert can – without any risk to his reputation
– release bad information which then becomes incorporated into prices. In this case, price
volatility increases and market liquidity decreases.
Reputational cascades are instrumental to understanding the role played by experts in
asset price bubbles. As long as the market is informative about the type of the expert, then
large price movements driven by low-ability experts are impeded on two fronts. (i) A low-
ability expert’s reputation will on average decrease, maintaining prices low; (ii) low-ability
experts tend to avoid publishing information. In a cascade, these two arguments no longer
hold, and a low-ability expert inevitably exerts greater influence on prices.
A crash occurs when the market exits a reputational cascade driven by a low-ability expert.
At this point, the market starts losing faith in the ability of the expert, and prices suddenly
dive. This mechanism contrasts with usual arguments. Rather than being caused by the
release of new information, the crash is a result of the depreciation of old information. Thus,
events that may seem insignificant with respect to the underlying value of the asset can trigger
large changes in asset prices, because they affect beliefs about the information that is already
incorporated into prices.
The results presented here constitute a step toward understanding the role of financial
experts in asset markets.
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A Trader Behavior and Uniqueness
In this section we derive an auxiliary result on trader behavior and use this to show a unique-
ness result needed for our main theorem.
To shorten notation, let A indicate an informed trader observing (rt, st) = (1, 1), B an
informed trader observing (1, 0), C an informed trader observing (−1, 1) and D an informed
trader observing (−1, 0). Note already that it is not possible to order the valuations of A-D
generally: the ordering is history-dependent. Let in what follows X > Y if the valuation
of X is greater than the valuation of Y . The following lemma gathers some preliminary
observations.
Lemma 4. In equilibrium and when λt ∈ (0, 1):
1. if θGt (Rt−1,−1) ≥ 0 then A > {B,C} > D.
2. if θGt (Rt−1,−1) < 0 < θGt (Rt−1, 1) then A > {B,D} > C.
3. if θGt (Rt−1, 1) ≤ 0 then B > {A,D} > C.
Just as the ordering of the valuations of A-D depends on the entire history, so does the
pattern of trade during period t. For instance, if θGt (Rt−1,−1) ≥ 0 it is possible to show that
– in equilibrium – A buys with probability 1, D sells with probability 1, while the behavior
of B and C is indeterminate in general. By contrast, if θGt (Rt−1,−1) < 0 < θGt (Rt−1, 1)
then A buys with probability 1, C sells with probability 1, while the behavior of B and D is
indeterminate in general.
Lemma 4 is instrumental in showing the uniqueness of the cascade equilibrium. It allows us
to identify the “marginal trader” in a cascade equilibrium. For instance, if θGt (Rt−1,−1) ≥ 0
then in a cascade A > B > C > D. Thus, the buyer with the lowest valuation is B whereas
the seller with the highest valuation is C. The other result which is instrumental to showing
uniqueness is Proposition 4, which tells us that in a cascade, σt = qt, whereas outside a
cascade σt < qt. Thus, a non-cascade equilibrium would involve either σ
+
t < q
+
t , σ
−
t < q
−
t or
both. Checking the incentives of the marginal traders, we can then show the following lemma.
Lemma 5. There exists λ˜t ∈ (0, 1) such that if λt ≥ λ˜t and a cascade equilibrium exists, then
this equilibrium is unique.
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B Information Timing
On 18 September 2013 the Fed announced that it would continue to stimulate the US econ-
omy. Such statements are introduced directly into the computers of trading companies and
converted into trades within a fraction of a second. News organizations are given previous
access to the information, but can only publish it at the same time as the official statement of
the Fed. Normally, the Chicago market reacts to announcements after a few miliseconds, due
to the distance that information must travel from the Fed’s headquarters in Washington to
traders in Chicago. But in this case trading began immediately, prompting an investigation by
the Fed into whether some news providers had taken the information out of the headquarters
and published it from servers in Chicago. It was estimated that as much as 600 million dollars
in assets changed hands in that split second, yielding huge profits to those Chicago traders
who had access to the information first.28
The story illustrates that even the smallest differences in the timing of information can
have tremendous impacts on trading. Thus, our assumption about the timing of information is
far from innocuous and therefore we investigate it further in this section. First, we show that
if information is received simultaneously, reputational cascades are impossible. Having estab-
lished this result, we next build micro-foundations for the asymmetry assumption, showing
that when early information acquisition is costly, it is natural for traders to better informed.
B.1 Simultaneous Information Markets
We start by showing that the assumption of a difference between traders and market makers
in terms of when they receive the report is crucial for the results. If reports are received
simultaneously, then the trader only has one piece of private information, which is st. Thus,
because the price already incorporates the report, the trader’s decision to buy or sell must be
motivated by his information about the expert’s type.
Suppose that traders and the market maker were to observe the expert’s report before
trade. The report rt is published and observed by all market participants. Moreover, suppose
θGt (Rt) > 0.29 The expected asset value of an informed trader is θGt (Rt) if he observes st = 1,
and λt(rt, 0)θ
G
t (Rt) if he observes st = 0. The market maker only observes rt, and thus before
trading starts, has valuation λt(rt)θ
G
t (Rt). Evidently, in any equilibrium an informed trader
must buy the asset with probability 1 if he observes st = 1. Consider next the trading strategy
28Source: http://www.cnbc.com/id/101056168.
29The analysis is symmetric in the alternative θGt (Rt) < 0, and trivial if θGt (Rt) = 0.
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of an informed trader observing st = 0. If he sells the asset with probability α then the bid
price is
pbt =
γα
γα + (1− γ)λt(rt, 0)θ
G
t (Rt) +
1− γ
γα + (1− γ)λt(rt)θ
G
t (Rt),
where γ = µ
µ+(1−µ)/2 . For any α ∈ [0, 1], this is strictly greater than what he expects the asset
to be worth. Thus, in any equilibrium an informed trader must sell the asset with probability
1 if he observes st = 0. But then a reputational cascade cannot occur since the trader’s
action reveals his private information. This leads to the following proposition, which we state
without further proof.30
Proposition 5. When all market participants acquire information simultaneously, there is
never a reputational cascade.
We can easily interpret this result in terms of marginal informativeness. Simultaneous
information is similar to the limit situation in which I = 0, i.e. the report is uninformative.
In this case the cutoff λˆt is one, which implies that reputational cascades never occur. Of
course, when information is simultaneous the report is not uninformative in the sense of not
containing information about the asset, but it is uninformative in the sense that its information
is already incorporated into prices, and thus cannot be used to generate profits for the traders.
Having established this result, we move on to building a microfoundation for the asymmetry
of information that will give us conditions under which it is warranted.
B.2 Micro-foundations
Proposition 5 establishes that the market is always maximally responsive when traders and
the market maker observe the expert’s report before trade. The assumption that traders
observe the report before trade takes place, while the market maker observes the report only
after trade has taken place, is thus crucial to the results of this paper. In this section, we
investigate the appropriateness of this assumption.
Suppose that all market participants face the option of acquiring reports early, i.e. before
trade takes place in period t, but that doing so involves a cost c. This may represent the
cost of time, or efforts, needed to monitor the FE’s announcement. We model competition
explicitly and assume N > 1 market makers, such that traders (including liquidity traders)
buy at the lowest ask price, sell for the highest bid price, and randomize if the prices are the
30We have shown the result for θGt (Rt) > 0. The remaining cases are similar.
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same. Incentives to acquire information are inseparable from the institutional structures of
the markets in which trading takes place. Although recent electronic facilities have blurred the
traditional distinctions, there remains grossly speaking two basic ways to organize financial
markets – exchange and over-the-counter. Since they provide complementary views we shall
here consider both types of markets which, for the purpose of this paper, we shall distinguish
as follows.
Definition 3. We say that the market is a financial exchange if the prices of each mar-
ket maker are observable by all market participants, and that the market is over-the-counter
(OTC) if each price is only observed by traders and the market maker quoting it.
In our model, the difference between the two types of markets boils down to one of public
versus private prices. Whether or not prices are publicly known to all market makers should
clearly make a great difference to the incentives for acquiring information. The next propo-
sition summarizes this section’s principal results, and supports our assumption regarding the
timing of information acquisition.
Proposition 6.
1. If the market is a financial exchange then there exists c such that for 0 < c < c informed
traders acquire reports early while market makers do not.
2. If the market is OTC then there exist c and c, both greater than zero, such that for
c < c < c informed traders acquire reports early while market makers do not.
The first part of the proposition is a straightforward instance of the Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980) paradox.31 A market maker who acquires information early can attempt to undercut
his competitors. However he reveals by doing so that the asset is overvalued, and will in turn
be undercut until all arbitrage opportunities are exhausted. But then paying c > 0 to acquire
information was wasteful in the first place.
The opacity of OTC markets makes the acquisition of information relatively more profitable
than is the case for exchanges. While no market maker can sell the asset for more than his
competitors – nor buy it for less – an informed market maker can on the other hand select
the trades which he wishes to engage in. For instance, if a market maker believes the asset to
31The Grossman-Stiglitz paradox says that if a market were informationally efficient, that is, all relevant
information is already reflected in market prices, then no single agent would have sufficient incentives to
acquire the information on which prices are based.
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be undervalued because he has observed rt = 1 he can then refuse to sell the asset at a price
pat (by raising his own ask price) while still accepting to buy the asset for a price p
b
t which
he knows to be cheap. In contrast to the case of financial exchanges, market makers thus do
have incentives to acquire information early in OTC markets. Nevertheless, it should be clear
that – on average – market makers are unable to trade profitably with informed traders. The
probability of a profitable trade is thus at most 1− µ for market makers, while it is exactly 1
for informed traders. We show that, as a consequence, incentives to acquire information early
are always greater for traders than they are for market makers. Thus, for some intermediate
cost range, traders will acquire reports early while market makers will not.
C Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: Let Mt(x) =
λtx
λtx+1−λt and define lt =
Pt(rt,yt|G)
Pt(rt,yt|B,σrtt )
to be the likelihood
ratio of the period t outcome. Thus, λt = Mt(1) and λt+1 = Mt(lt). At the beginning of
period t the likelihood ratio lt is a random variable. As in the text we can define the expected
reputation conditional on rt. Here it will be convenient to condition also on the strategy, so
we write λet+1(rt, σ
rt
t ) = Et(λt+1|rt, σrtt , B). First, notice that
lt =
qrtt
σrtt
· P(yt|rt, G)
P(yt|rt, B) .
This is well-defined since σrtt > 0 always.
32 Hence λet (rt, σ
rt
t ) is strictly decreasing in σ
rt
t .
The first part of the equilibrium condition (2) can be written as
λet (−1, σ−t )− λet (0, 1− σ+t − σ−t ) = 0. (10)
The derivative of the left-hand side with respect to σ+t and σ
−
t is always strictly negative.
Furthermore, if σ−t = 0 the left-hand side is positive and if σ
−
t = 1 − σ+t the left-hand side
is negative. Therefore, there exists an implicit function f(σ+t ) such that σ
−
t = f(σ
+
t ) solves
32To see that σrtt > 0, notice that q
r
t > 0 for all r. If σ
r
t = 0 for some r, we would have λt(r, yt, 0) = 1, and
the expert could gain perfect reputation by choosing rt = r. This is a contradiction.
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(10). Remark that
∂λet (0,1−σ+t −σ−t )
∂σ+t
=
∂λet (0,1−σ+t −σ−t )
∂σ−t
. Implicit differentiation then gives
f ′(σ+t ) = −
 −∂λet (0,1−σ+t −σ−t )∂σ−t
∂λet (−1,σ−t )
∂σ−t
− ∂λet (0,1−σ+t −σ−t )
∂σ−t
 .
Both the nominator and the denominator of the fraction are negative. Hence, f ′(σ+t ) ∈ (−1, 0).
Now, let
∆t(σ
+
t , σ
−
t ) = λ
e
t (+1, σ
+
t )− λet (0, 1− σ+t − σ−t ).
The second equilibrium condition from (2) can be written as ∆t(σ
+
t , σ
−
t ) = 0. Notice that ∆t(·)
is strictly decreasing in both arguments. Using the implicit function derived above we can
combine the two equilibrium conditions and reduce (2) to a single condition: ∆t(σ
+
t , f(σ
+
t )) =
0. Then
d∆t(σ
+
t , f(σ
+
t ))
dσ+t
=
dλet (+1, σ
+
t )
dσ+t
− dλ
e
t (0, 1− σ+t − σ−t )
dσ+t
(
1 + f ′(σ+t )
)
< 0.
This implies uniqueness of the best-response strategy. Existence follows from noting that
∆t(0, f(0)) ≥ 0 while ∆t(1, f(1)) ≤ 0. We now show the two remaining statements of the
lemma.
Part 1.
Whenever ξyt
t
(rt, 1) = ξ
yt
t
(rt, 0) we have lt =
q
rt
t
σ
rt
t
. Thus, if σt = qt then Et(λt+1|B) = λt. Notice
that
Et(lt|B) =
∑
rt
σrtt
∑
yt
P(yt|rt, B)
[
qrtt
σrtt
· P(yt|rt, G)
P(yt|rt, B)
]
= 1.
Suppose σrtt 6= qrtt for some rt, such that lt is not constant. The concavity of Mt(·) and Jensen’s
inequality then imply that
Et(Mt(lt)|B) < Mt(Et(lt|B)) = Mt(1).
This implies that Et(λt+1|B) < λt. Clearly, this cannot be optimal for the expert.
Part 2.
Now, we will show that σt < qt whenever ξ
yt
t
(rt, 1) 6= ξytt (rt, 0) for some (yt, rt). We can
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repeat the arguments from Part 1 to show that this implies that Et(λt+1|B) < λt regardless
of σt. Consequently, in equilibrium λ
e
t+1(rt, σ
rt
t ) < λt for all rt.
Since q0t = 1− qt, σ0t = 1− σt and P(st = 0|rt = 0) = 1, then λet+1(0, σ0t ) = Mt( 1−qt1−σt ). This
is increasing in σt. Then λ
e
t+1(0, σ
0
t ) < λt can only be true if σt < qt.

Proof of Lemma 2: To establish uniqueness notice that since by definition λt is given at the
beginning of period t, valuations vt(·) depend only on σt. Recall that the price is given by pytt =
Et(θt|yt, pytt ). The right-hand side of this equation is non-decreasing in pytt if Et[θt|yt, pytt ] > pytt
and non-increasing in pytt if Et[θt|yt, pytt ] < pytt . Thus pytt is uniquely determined.
If θgt (Rt−1,−1) ≥ 0 then pbt < p0t < pat follows from the fact that max(rt,st){vt(rt, st)} >
p0t > min(rt,st){vt(rt, st)}, which is shown in the proof of Lemma 4. Other cases can be proven
similarly.

Proof of Lemma 3: Part 1 is immediate, since by definition of a reputational cascade no
information about expert type reaches the market.
We next show parts 2 and 3. Suppose that θGt (Rt−1,−1) ≥ 0 (the proofs for the remaining
cases follow similar lines and are therefore omitted). We show in Appendix A that a trader
who observes (rt, st) = (1, 1) buys the asset with probability 1 while a trader who observes
(rt, st) = (−1, 0) sells the asset with probability 1. Thus if a trader with (rt, st) = (1, 0)
does not buy the asset with probability 1 then Pt(yt = a, rt = 1|G) > Pt(yt = a, rt = 1|B),
contradicting (9). Similarly if a trader with (rt, st) = (−1, 1) does not sell the asset with
probability 1 then Pt(yt = b, rt = −1|G) < Pt(yt = b, rt = −1|B), contradicting (9).

Proof of Proposition 2: According to Proposition 4, in a reputational cascade then σt = qt.
This implies, among other things, that if the market is in a reputational cascade then a
trader observing (rt, st) = (0, 0) learns nothing about the asset nor about the expert. Thus
vt(0, 0) = p
0
t and, since by Lemma 2 we have p
a
t > p
0
t > p
b
t , this trader abstains.
We split the rest of the proof into four cases.
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Case 1: Suppose θGt (Rt−1,−1) ≥ 0. By Lemma 4, a trader with (rt, st) = (1, 1) buys the asset
with probability 1 while a trader with (rt, st) = (−1, 0) sells the asset with probability 1. A
reputational cascade thus occurs if and only if (i) a trader with (rt, st) = (1, 0) buys always
and (ii) a trader with (rt, st) = (−1, 1) sells always. The necessary and sufficient conditions for
a cascade to be supported in equilibrium are thus that (i) vt(1, 0) is no less than the weighted
average of vt(1, 1) on the one hand and the valuation of a liquidity trader on the other hand
(viz. p0t ), and (ii) vt(1, 1) is no more than the weighted average of vt(−1, 0) on the one hand
and the valuation of a liquidity trader on the other hand.
The first condition can be written as
λt(1− pi)q+t
λt(1− pi)q+t + (1− λt)q+t
·θGt (Rt−1, 1) ≥
γλtq
+
t
γq+t + 1− γ
·θGt (Rt−1, 1)+
1− γ
γq+t + 1− γ
λt ·θGt (Rt−1),
where γ = µ
µ+(1−µ)/2 , as defined in Appendix B. This is satisfied for λt ≥ λˆ+t , where
λˆ+t = 1−
1− pi
pi
·
(1− γ)
(
1− θGt (Rt−1)
θGt (Rt−1,1)
)
γq+t + (1− γ) θ
G
t (Rt−1)
θGt (Rt−1,1)
. (11)
The second condition can be written as
θGt (Rt−1,−1) ≤
γλtq
−
t
γq−t + 1− γ
· θGt (Rt−1,−1) +
1− γ
γq−t + 1− γ
λt · θGt (Rt−1).
This in turn is satisfied for λt ≥ λˆ−t , where
λˆ−t = 1−
(1− γ)
(
1− θGt (Rt−1,−1)
θGt (Rt−1)
)
γq−t
θGt (Rt−1,−1)
θGt (Rt−1)
+ 1− γ
. (12)
Letting λˆt = max{λˆ+t , λˆ−t }, the previous arguments thus establish that a cascade equilibrium
exists if and only if λt ≥ λˆt. Lemma 5 concludes the proof of the proposition.
Case 2: Suppose now θGt (Rt−1) > 0 > θGt (Rt−1,−1). In this case, λˆ+t is given by (11), whereas
λˆ−t = 1−
1− pi
pi
·
(1− γ)
(
1− θGt (Rt−1)
θGt (Rt−1,−1)
)
γq−t + (1− γ) θ
G
t (Rt−1)
θGt (Rt−1,−1)
< λˆ+t .
30
The inequality follows from
θGt (Rt−1)
θGt (Rt−1,−1)
< 0 <
θGt (Rt−1)
θGt (Rt−1,1)
and the fact that θGt (Rt−1) > 0 implies
q+t > q
−
t . Thus λˆt = λˆ
+
t . The remaining arguments are identical to Case 1.
Case 3: Suppose now θGt (Rt−1,−1) < 0 < θGt (Rt−1). The analysis is similar to Case 2.
Case 4: Suppose now θGt (Rt−1, 1) ≤ 0. The analysis is similar to Case 1.

Proof of Proposition 3: Immediate from inspection of (11) and (12).

Proof of Theorem 1: Consider history Ht such that θGt (Rt−1,−1) > 0. The remaining
cases can be established similarly. We begin by showing that for λt small then γ big enough
implies that λt+1 becomes arbitrarily large with positive probability. Observe that λt → 0
implies pat → 0. Given θGt (Rt−1,−1) > 0, we have on the other hand vt(1, 1) > 0 and
vt(−1, 1) > 0. This shows that for λt small, traders with (rt, st) = (1, 1) and (−1, 1) buy the
asset with probability 1. We also know that (rt, st) = (−1, 0) sells the asset with probability
1. So rt = −1 followed by yt = a induces reputation λt+1 = Mt( q
−
t
σ−t
.γpi+(1−γ)
1−γ ). The numerator
of the fraction is bounded below by 1
2
(1 − φ)[γpi + (1 − γ)] and thus, if γ goes to one, the
fraction goes to positive infinity. Noting that limx→∞Mt(x) = 1 then establishes the claim.
Proposition 2 in conjunction with the claim above (and the fact that due to liquidity
traders any history occurs with positive probability) finishes to establish the first part of the
theorem, while Propositions 2 and 3 together establish the second part of the theorem.

Proof of Lemma 4: We prove the first case. Other cases can be proven along similar lines.
That A > B and C > D is immediate from (5) and (6). We now show that A > p0t > D.
That A > p0t is obvious. Notice further that in order to show p
0
t > D it is enough to show
that βt(−1, 0) ≤ λt. So suppose βt(−1, 0) > λt. Clearly then λet (−1) ≥ βt(−1, 0). Thus
λet (−1) > λt. But we have shown in Proposition 4 that λet (0) ≤ λt. Hence λet (0) < λet (−1),
which cannot be in equilibrium. This concludes the proof.
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Proof of Lemma 5: We work the proof for the case where θGt (Rt−1,−1) ≥ 0. The remaining
cases are similar, and therefore omitted.
We first establish an intermediary claim, namely that for λt high enough then, in any
equilibrium, a trader observing (rt, st) = (0, 0) abstains. First, observe that vt(0, 0) tends to
p0t as λt tends to 1. Using lemma 2, it therefore only remains to show that both bid and ask
prices are bounded away from p0t when λt tends to 1. That p
a
t is bounded away from p
0
t follows
from the fact that vt(1, 1) > p
0
t while the probability of an informed trader with (rt, st) = (1, 1)
is µλtq
+
t pi ≥ 12(1− φ)µλtpi →λt→1 12(1− φ)µpi > 0. In a similar way, that pbt is bounded away
from p0t follows from the fact that vt(−1, 0) < p0t while the probability of an informed trader
with (rt, st) = (−1, 0) is at least µλtq−t (1−pi) ≥ 12(1−φ)µλt(1−pi)→λt→1 12(1−φ)µ(1−pi) > 0.
We have thus established the claim, and henceforth assume λt high enough so as to ignore
traders with (rt, st) = (0, 0).
It will be useful in what follows to augment the notation and let vt(rt, st, σ
rt
t ) denote an
informed trader’s valuation, in order to reflect the fact that the latter depends in general on
the strategy of a bad expert. As noted in the body of the paper, a non-cascade equilibrium
must involve either σ+t < q
+
t , σ
−
t < q
−
t or both. We consider each of these possibilities in turn.
Case 1. Suppose σ+t < q
+
t . Note then that vt(1, 0, σ
+
t ) > vt(1, 0, q
+
t ). By definition of
a cascade equilibrium, vt(1, 0, q
+
t ) is no less than the weighted average of the valuations of
liquidity traders on the one hand and informed traders observing (rt, st) = (1, 1) on the other
hand. The same thus holds – with strict inequality – for vt(1, 0, σ
+
t ), and establishes that in
the non-cascade equilibrium a trader observing (rt, st) = (1, 0) must be buying the asset with
probability 1. But then λet+1(1) > λt, which is impossible in an equilibrium.
Case 2. Suppose σ+t ≥ q+t . By implication σ−t < q−t and, in turn, vt(−1, 0, σ−t ) > vt(−1, 0, q−t ).
Compared with the cascade equilibrium, the weighted average of the valuations of liquidity
traders and traders with (rt, st) = (−1, 0) is thus strictly greater in the non-cascade equilib-
rium. So either (i) pbt > vt(−1, 1), or (ii) traders with (rt, st) = (1, 0) are selling the asset
and pushing the bid price down. Case (i) is ruled out, since it would involve λet+1(−1) > λt,
which is impossible in an equilibrium. Case (ii) on the other hand implies that, conditional
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on rt = −1, traders with st = 0 never trade according to traders with st = 1. Given that
σ+t ≥ q+t and σ−t < q−t , we thus have λet+1(−1) > λet+1(1), contradicting (2).

Proof of Proposition 6: The proof of the first part essentially consists of the arguments
presented in the body of the paper. The threshold c can here be chosen to be any number lesser
or equal than the expected profits made by informed traders when these acquire information
early but market makers do not. We now prove the second part, concerning OTC markets.
We do this in two steps.
Step 1. Incentives to acquire information. When a player does not acquire early information he
expects zero payoff. Suppose now that c is such that traders acquire information early. Since
they learn more from the reports than market makers (they observe st), it ensues that market
makers cannot on average gain against informed traders. Market makers only profit when a
liquidity trader reveals himself by trading “against the market”. Under these assumptions, a
market maker’s willingness-to-pay for information is33
ΠMM =
1− µ
2
∑
rt
P(rt)
[
max{0,Et[θt|rt]− pbt}+ max{0, pat − Et[θt|rt]}
]
.
The first term is profit made from buying when the bid price is too low, and the second term
is the probability of selling when the ask price is too high. Any other trade is denied by the
MM.34 A trader’s willingness-to-pay for information is
ΠIT =
∑
rt,st
P(rt, st) max{0,Et[θt|rt, st]− pat , pbt − Et[θt|rt, st]}.
Now, observe that an uninformed market maker gains on liquidity traders and loses on in-
formed traders. In particular, his profits are (1− µ)ΠLT − µΠIT , where the gain on liquidity
33If there is more than one ask price and one bid price then choose pat to be the lowest ask price offered and
pbt to be the highest bid price offered.
34By setting his ask price lower than the market, or his bid price higher.
33
traders is
(1− µ)ΠLT = 1− µ
2
[
pat − pbt
]
=
1− µ
2
∑
rt
P(rt)
[
(Et[θt|rt]− pbt) + (pat − Et[θt|rt])
]
= ΠMM − Π,
and
Π =
1− µ
2
∑
rt
P(rt)
[
max{0, pbt − Et[θt|rt]}+ max{0,Et[θt|rt]− pat }
]
.
Uninformed market makers make zero profits, i.e. (1 − µ)ΠLT − µΠIT = 0. We can use this
to rewrite the informed market maker’s gain as
ΠMM = Π + µΠIT
< (1− µ)
∑
rt
P(rt) max{0,Et[θt|rt]− pat , pbt − Et[θt|rt]}+ µΠIT
≤ (1− µ)
∑
rt,st
P(rt, st) max{0,Et[θt|rt, st]− pat , pbt − Et[θt|rt, st]}+ µΠIT
= ΠIT .
Thus, when traders acquire information, they always have more incentive to do so than market
makers.
Step 2. Identifying cost thresholds. Step 1 shows us that if we set c = ΠMM and c = ΠIT ,
then for c ∈ (c, c) it is an equilibrium for traders to acquire information early, and for no
market maker to do so. Notice that it cannot be an equilibrium for market makers to acquire
information and traders not to do so. Suppose all market makers acquire early information.
Competition would then drive profits to zero, and information acquisition is not optimal.
Suppose then M < N market makers acquire early information. In that case, traders can
still trade with uninformed market makers, and the arguments of Step 1 are valid. Thus, the
unique equilibrium is for traders only to acquire early information.

34
Proof of Result 1: When the market is in a reputational cascade, the trading frequency is
µqt + (1− µ), since good and bad experts induce trades with the same probability. Outside a
cascade, the expected frequency is bounded above by
max{µ(λtqt(1− pi) + (1− λt)σt), µλtqtpi}+ 1− µ.
Clearly, this is lower than µqt + (1− µ) since σt < qt by Proposition 4.

Proof of Result 2: If θGt (Rt−1) > 0, it is easy to show that q+t > q−t . Since a price increase
(decrease) occurs only after a buy (sell), the statement of the result follows immediately.

Proof of Result 3: We will show the result for the fixed value case. Denote by nt =
#s≤t(xs = 1) the number of positive reports, mt = #s≤t(xs = −1) the number of nega-
tive reports, and dt = nt − mt. Inspection of (11) and (12) shows us that λˆt depends only
on λt and the marginal informativeness (I
+
t , I
−
t ). Thus, in a cascade λˆt, depends only on
(I+t , I
−
t ). Furthermore, Proposition 3 shows that λˆt is decreasing in It. The last thing we need
to show is that It is strictly increasing in |dt|. Observe that I+t = I+(dt) = 1 − 1−Φdt1+Φdt 1+Φ
dt+1
1−Φdt+1
and I−t = I
−(dt) = 1 − 1−Φdt1+Φdt 1+Φ
dt−1
1−Φdt−1 . It is easy to see from that I
+
t (dt) = I
−
t (−dt), and
differentiation gives us that for r ∈ {−,+} then Ir(dt) is increasing (decreasing) in dt when
dt > 0 (dt < 0). It follows that sensitivity must be higher at the end of a cascade than before.

Proof of Result 4: This result has been shown in the proof of Lemma 1.

Proof of Result 5: In a cascade all traders who see rt = 1 buy and this is the unique
equilibrium (see Lemma 5 above). Thus v(1, st) > pˆ
a
t . Inspecting the price equation (7), we
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can see that p˜at = αpˆ
a
t + (1 − α)v(1, s′) for some α ∈ (0, 1) and s′ ∈ {0, 1}. Hence p˜at > pˆat .
The argument is similar for pbt , and is therefore omitted.

Proof of Result 6: Since Et(pˆt) = Et(p˜t) = p0t , then Results 1 and 5 imply that the distri-
bution of p˜t is a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of pˆt. The conclusion then follows
from the convexity of the variance function.

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